Introduction
Twenty years have passed since African leaders articulated a united stance on reforming the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) through the Ezulwini Consensus. Adopted by the African Union (AU) in 2005, the Ezulwini Consensus emerged as the Common African Position on UNSC reform, demanding two permanent seats for Africa (with all the prerogatives of current permanent members, including the veto) and five non-permanent seats for the continent. [1] This stance was rooted in Africa’s historical exclusion: in 1945 most African nations were under colonial rule and had no say in shaping the UN, and even by 1965 (when the Council’s membership was last revised) Africa’s representation remained limited. [2] Today, Africa comprises 54 countries (approximately 28% of UN membership) and is the subject of a disproportionate share of the UNSC’s agenda, yet not a single African country holds a permanent seat. These realities underpin Africa’s ongoing two-decade-old campaign to “decolonize” the UNSC’s composition and rectify what is widely viewed as a historical injustice.
This article reviews the genesis and evolution of the Ezulwini Consensus and evaluates Africa’s influence on UNSC reform debates over the past twenty years. It also examines Africa’s negotiating power in an increasingly multipolar world and considers whether new strategies are needed as the quest for Security Council reform enters its third decade. Recent developments, from renewed global rhetoric in favor of reform to Africa’s diplomatic gains, such as the AU’s admission into the G20, make this assessment timely. Has Africa’s unified voice made a difference, and how should the continent adapt going forward? The sections below analyze the strides made and obstacles encountered since 2005, concluding with reflections on future pathways for African diplomacy on UNSC reform and beyond.
The Genesis of the Ezulwini Consensus: A Unified African Voice
The Ezulwini Consensus was born out of a need for Africa to speak with one voice on UNSC reform. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, momentum gathered to reform the UNSC to reflect better contemporary global realities, including the glaring absence of Africa in the permanent membership. As various reform proposals emerged, African states recognized that fragmentation would weaken their bargaining position. The AU established a Committee of Ten (C10) in 2005 representing all sub-regions of the continent, to develop a common stance and lobby internationally. [3] In March 2005, at an extraordinary AU session in Ezulwini, Swaziland (Eswatini), African foreign ministers adopted what became known as the Ezulwini Consensus, later endorsed by Heads of State in the Sirte Declaration of July 2005. [4]
Ezulwini’s core demands were clear and ambitious: Africa sought no fewer than two permanent seats on a reformed UNSC – with the same veto powers enjoyed by the current P5 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), plus five non-permanent seats. [5] This would theoretically expand the Council to 26 members, aligning with one of the reform models discussed at the UN in 2005. The justification was both moral and practical. Morally, Africans argued, the post-1945 international order had sidelined an entire continent; no African nation had been present when the UN Charter was drafted, and the resulting power imbalance perpetuated a “historical injustice.” [6] Practically, African leaders noted that African conflicts and issues dominate the UNSC’s agenda, yet decision-making power over those issues rests with outsiders. For example, by some accounts, nearly half of all Security Council deliberations in recent decades have concerned African peace and security crises, from protracted conflicts in the Great Lakes region to complex emergencies in the Horn of Africa. [7]. Empowering Africa with permanent seats was seen as necessary to make the Council more representative and enhance its legitimacy and effectiveness in responding to conflicts on African soil.
Crucially, the Ezulwini Consensus signified unprecedented African unity on a major global governance question. The African Union (AU), newly formed in 2002, replacing the old Organisation of African Unity, demonstrated that its member states could agree on a common platform even amid diverse interests. In the past, African states had floated different ideas for UNSC reform, but Ezulwini became the single voice of the continent. This unity was expected to bolster Africa’s negotiating power. With 54 votes in the UN General Assembly, a cohesive African bloc could significantly influence building the two-thirds majority needed for any UNSC reform resolution. African unity also aimed to prevent external powers from using “divide-and-rule” tactics. If Africa remained firm and unanimous, other global players would be compelled to take its demands seriously.
The C10 was tasked to champion the Ezulwini Consensus on the world stage, engaging with other regional groupings and key UNSC stakeholders. Over the subsequent two decades, the C10 (led by Sierra Leone as the coordinator) consistently worked to keep the “African Common Position” on the agenda at the UN. The very phrase “Ezulwini Consensus” gained international recognition as shorthand for Africa’s stance on UNSC reform. This unified front did face an inherent challenge: while Ezulwini deliberately did not name which countries should occupy the sought-after African permanent seats, behind the scenes, several regional powers, notably Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt, saw themselves as natural contenders. Indeed, in 2005 each of those countries (along with others like Kenya and Senegal) declared their candidacies to represent Africa, necessitating the AU to diplomatically sidestep the rivalries by focusing on principles over personalities. [8] The genius of Ezulwini was that it papered over this contentious question, at least temporarily, by asserting that Africa as a whole must choose its representatives when the time comes. [9] In essence, the early months of 2005 saw polite pan-African diplomacy give way to tough bargaining both among African states themselves and between the AU and other coalitions like the G4 (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan), who were also campaigning for permanent seats. The eventual Ezulwini framework preserved African unity by postponing the decision of “who gets the seat” until reform is achieved, thereby presenting a unified African voice to the rest of the world.
Two Decades of Advocacy: Strides and Stagnation
In the 20 years since Ezulwini, Africa’s advocacy for UNSC reform has been persistent. On the positive side, Africa’s unified position has ensured that the question of Council reform and Africa’s rightful place in it has never fallen off the UN agenda. The AU and African delegations raise the Ezulwini Consensus at virtually every UN General Assembly session and in the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform. This consistency has yielded a broad recognition of the validity of Africa’s grievance. Notably, all five permanent UNSC members have, in principle, voiced support for greater African representation on the Council.[10] Over the past two years, this chorus grew louder: in 2021 the UN Secretary-General’s report Our Common Agenda explicitly highlighted the need to address Africa’s under-representation and in 2022 and 2023 heads of government from the United States, United Kingdom, France, China and Russia each made statements endorsing the idea of African countries becoming permanent Council members.[11] For example, US President Joe Biden told the General Assembly in 2022 that the United States supports “increasing the number of both permanent and non-permanent representatives of the Council” – including permanent seats for Africa Similarly, France’s Foreign Ministry in 2023 reiterated it was “abnormal” for Africa to have no permanent member and declared this “must change now” [12] Such statements would have been almost unthinkable in 2005; African advocacy has clearly shifted the conversation from whether Africa deserves permanent seats to when and how they should be granted.
African states have also leveraged their collective weight to make procedural gains. The three non-permanent African members of the UNSC (the “A3”, always one each from North, West, and Southern Africa) now often coordinate their votes and statements and work in tandem with the AU’s Peace and Security Council to present African regional positions on country-specific files. This has improved the coherence of African influence on the Council’s day-to-day work, even in the absence of a permanent seat. Additionally, African diplomats have forged alliances with other reform-minded states. The L.69 Group (a coalition of developing countries pressing for expansion) has strong African participation, and the AU’s C10 regularly engages with the G4 and other stakeholders to seek common ground on reform models. These efforts kept the flame of UNSC reform alive during periods when political will was low. It is arguable that without Africa’s unwavering pressure, the world might have dropped the idea of reform after the last major attempt in 2005 faltered. Instead, the issue remains on the table – a testament to African persistence.
However, the record of the past two decades also reveals significant stagnation and missed opportunities. Despite dozens of high-level meetings and debates, no actual reform of the Council’s composition has been achieved. The Ezulwini Consensus itself has not translated into the amendment of the UN Charter that would be required to create new permanent seats. The reasons are multifaceted:
- Veto Power Dilemma: Africa’s insistence that any new permanent members must have the same veto rights as current members proved to be a double-edged sword. On one hand, it is a principled stance for equality; on the other, it became a primary sticking point in negotiations. The P5 are exceedingly reluctant to extend veto privileges (which they alone enjoy) or to countenance veto abolition. In 2005, the G4 nations signaled a willingness to defer veto rights for new permanents for 15 years. However, the AU (driven by Ezulwini) refused to compromise on the veto question. [13] This contributed to a deadlock. Many observers have since argued that Africa’s maximalist position, though understandable, is “impractical in practice” under current power dynamics. [14] Indeed, any Charter amendment requires ratification by all P5 members, making veto reform extraordinarily difficult. [15] Over the years, no P5 member has agreed to create new veto-wielding members. Some have used Africa’s stance as a convenient reason to stall progress.
Lack of Internal Consensus on Representation: The Ezulwini Consensus achieved unity on paper, but African consensus has been fragile behind the scenes. The question of which countries would take Africa’s two permanent seats has remained unresolved for 20 years. The AU has not established any clear criteria or mechanism for selecting the would-be permanent representatives. [16] This ambiguity was intentional to preserve unity. However, it also undercuts the proposal’s credibility. Rivalry among Africa’s leading states occasionally surfaced. Back in 2005, Nigeria and South Africa (both strong contenders) had a well-documented divergence: they reportedly reached a rapprochement and even advocated for flexibility on the veto within the AU, but ultimately fell back in line with the consensus when no AU agreement materialized on a compromise.
- Meanwhile, other countries like Egypt, Kenya, Senegal, and Libya have also lobbied for consideration. [17] To date, no formula for rotating or allocating permanent African seats has been agreed upon. As a result, the “African common position” lacks operational clarity, and some outside powers privately question whether Africa’s unity would hold if reform negotiations got serious. This has given ammunition to those who prefer the status quo: they point to African disunity as an excuse for inaction. Past reform efforts often descended into a “blame game” with P5 members claiming that Africans themselves cannot decide on their representatives. At the same time, African leaders retort that such specifics will be sorted out once the principle of reform is accepted. [18] The net effect is a stalemate.
- Geopolitical Resistance and Competing Agendas: Beyond Africa’s control, a significant obstacle has been the broader lack of agreement among UN member states on UNSC reform. Apart from the P5’s reluctance to dilute their power, divisions among other regional groups have repeatedly undermined reform initiatives. Competing proposals: the G4 plan and the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group’s push for only non-permanent seat expansion, among others, have meant that no two-thirds majority in the General Assembly could ever coalesce around one model. While rhetorically supported by many in the Global South, Africa’s position sometimes collided with others; for instance, the G4 did not fully endorse veto rights for new members, diverging from Ezulwini. In 2005, it appeared Africa might drop the veto demand in exchange for an expansion to 26 seats (to align with the G4),[19] but ultimately the AU reaffirmed Ezulwini with veto included. The opportunity for a compromise deal passed, and a rare window closed without result. Since then, the so-called Intergovernmental Negotiations have dragged on without a concise negotiation text, hampered by procedural consensus rules and the staunch opposition of the “Coffee Club”/UfC (led by Italy, Pakistan, and others who oppose new permanent seats). [20] Even if Africa had been more flexible, it is unclear if reform would have succeeded given these headwinds.
Over twenty years, “strides and stagnation” aptly characterize Africa’s journey. The moral case for reform with Africa at its center has been largely won. No credible voice today denies that the Security Council, as currently constituted, lacks legitimacy for excluding an entire continent of over 1.3 billion people. The language of “historical injustice to Africa” has been mainstreamed in UN discourse, echoed by the UN Secretary-General and many others. [21] Moreover, Africa’s steadfastness has prevented half-measures from being imposed (for example, proposals that would expand the Council but still leave Africa without any permanent seat have gained no traction, because Africa’s opposition is decisive). In that sense, Ezulwini has been a defensive success: the world knows no reform can happen against Africa. However, offensive success: reform happening for Africa remains elusive. The UNSC has been unchanged since 1965, and African nations still wait for the day when one of their sits permanently at the world’s top decision-making table for peace and security. This dual reality sets the stage for examining how Africa’s influence fares in a changing global context, and whether the Ezulwini strategy is enough in the 2020s.
Africa’s Negotiating Power in a Multipolar World
The international terrain of 2025 is markedly different from that of 2005. The unipolar moment of the post-Cold War has given way to a more multipolar world order, with emerging powers gaining clout and traditional powers’ dominance contested. This environment presents new opportunities and challenges for Africa’s quest for UNSC reform.
On the one hand, global power shifts have opened diplomatic space for Africa. Major powers now compete for African partnerships and support in a way not seen since the Cold War. This has increased Africa’s leverage in forums like the UN. For instance, China positions itself as a champion of the Global South and has generally supported African demands in principle. Beijing regularly calls the under-representation of Africa an injustice. It has backed the idea of African permanent seats (albeit without explicitly endorsing veto rights). [22] Russia, too, has rhetorically supported African representation, especially as it seeks political alliances beyond the West. India and Brazil, leading voices of the G4, consider Africa’s inclusion essential to their reform agenda and have coordinated with the C10 at the UN. Even the Western powers have adjusted their stance: the United Kingdom used its Security Council presidency in 2024 to convene discussions on Council reform, including African representation[23] (and in late 2022, the United States officially announced support for “two permanent seats for Africa” – a significant policy shift by a P5 member that had long been ambivalent about expansion. [24] All these developments suggest that Africa’s calls are finally resonating in capitals that matter.
However, such support often comes with caveats. In the case of the US position, the fine print was that the two African seats would be non-veto permanent seats. Similarly, France, while strongly endorsing African permanent membership, has made clear it does not favor extending veto power to any new members. [25] The crux is that great powers are willing to enlarge the Council to include Africa but not necessarily to grant equal powers to Africa’s new members. From Africa’s perspective, this risks creating a tier of “second-class” permanent members, an outcome the Ezulwini Consensus explicitly rejects. African leaders, such as President Julius Maada Bio of Sierra Leone (current chair of the C10), have stated plainly that if the veto remains in use for the current P5, it must be extended to new permanents as a matter of justice. [26] Failing that, many African states would prefer the veto be abolished altogether. This principled stand puts Africa at odds with how the P5 envisions reform in a multipolar context. Washington, London, Paris, Beijing, and Moscow may agree on adding Africa in theory, but none of them appears ready to yield the privileged veto right that enshrines their supremacy. Thus, the multipolar world’s support is somewhat schizophrenic: it acknowledges Africa’s rise in geopolitical importance, yet stops short of truly equalizing the UNSC’s power structure.
Another aspect of multipolarity is the rise of alternative forums and coalitions where Africa’s voice can be amplified. Frustration with the slow pace of UN reforms has led African states to put greater energy into other multilateral engagements. The African Union itself has grown in stature and assertiveness. In 2023, the AU achieved a diplomatic victory by becoming a permanent member of the G20, the group of major world economies. [27] This gives Africa (through the AU chairperson) a seat at yet another high table of global decision-making. It was broadly hailed as a step toward correcting Africa’s marginalization in global governance, and it stemmed from concerted African lobbying supported by powers like India and the US. Similarly, Africa’s profile in the BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) has grown: South Africa joined BRICS in 2010, and more African states (e.g. Egypt, Ethiopia) have been invited to join in 2024. In an unprecedented move, the BRICS foreign ministers’ joint statement in 2023 explicitly acknowledged the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration as the basis for Africa’s representation demands. [28] This endorsement by a grouping containing two P5 members (China and Russia) and two aspirants (India and Brazil) is a diplomatic win for Africa, reflecting a convergence between African and broader Global South agendas.
The availability of these alternative platforms has given African leaders new bargaining chips. There is an implicit message to the UN’s established powers: if the United Nations does not reform to accommodate Africa, Africa will invest its hopes and energies elsewhere. As Murithi noted, continuing the status quo at the UNSC “will only push African countries towards other multilateral forums where they have a greater say in their affairs.” [29] We see this in the enthusiasm for forums like the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the rejuvenated South-South cooperation summits, and forums such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). These venues lack the power of the UNSC to make coercive decisions. However, they offer Africa diplomatic clout, development partnerships, and, in some cases, financial resources that Western-dominated institutions traditionally controlled. In short, a multipolar world allows Africa to diversify its diplomacy. No longer dependent on a single patron or bloc, African states can play different powers against each other to extract concessions. The US and Europe, for instance, might be more inclined to support African calls at the UN if they fear Africa drifting too far into China’s or Russia’s orbit.
However, multipolarity has its downsides for the African reform agenda. The rivalry among great powers can just as easily entrench paralysis at the UN. Heightened tensions (reminiscent of a new Cold War climate) make major powers even less willing to adjust the UNSC’s power balance. We currently witness deep divisions within the Council over issues like the Ukraine conflict; some P5 members may feel that expanding the Council in such a fraught environment could dilute their influence or create unpredictable outcomes. There is also the risk that overtures from competing powers could test Africa’s unity. For example, if a great power offers its backing for one African country’s candidacy (over others), it could sow discord within the AU. Multipolar competition thus requires deft navigation by African diplomats to maintain their solidarity and not become pawns in others’ games.
Overall, Africa’s negotiating power is arguably stronger today than it was twenty years ago. Africa cannot be easily ignored in global decision-making because of the continent’s importance as a source of vital minerals, a burgeoning market, and a strategic theatre for military and ideological influence. African states have become more confident in asserting collective positions (seen not only in UNSC reform but also in climate change negotiations and global trade talks). The mood in the Global South is also favorable to Africa’s cause. There is a palpable push to reform outdated international structures, with Africa’s exclusion from the UNSC often cited as the prime example of inequity. In the UN General Assembly, African proposals now routinely garner broad support from Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean. In 2022, for instance, a landmark resolution enhanced the African Union’s role in briefing the UNSC on African peace and security issues, a small but symbolic acknowledgment of Africa’s stake in Council deliberations.
In sum, the multipolar era has validated many of Africa’s arguments about UNSC reform and created new pathways for influence. However, it has not yet altered the fundamental power calculus in the UNSC. Africa’s friends and champions outside the continent remain reluctant to push as hard as needed to amend the Charter. This reality sets the stage for the following section: given the mix of progress and paralysis, should Africa rethink its strategy going forward, or stay the course with Ezulwini until its goals are met?
Beyond Ezulwini: Rethinking Strategies for the Future
As the Ezulwini Consensus turns twenty, African states face a strategic crossroads. The Common African Position has been remarkably consistent and has preserved solidarity, but the world has changed significantly since 2005. Africa may need to adapt its approach without abandoning its core principles to achieve tangible results. What might a recalibrated strategy look like?
1. Balancing Principle and Pragmatism: One option is to maintain the fundamental demands of Ezulwini (two permanent seats, veto power ) as non-negotiable principles while introducing flexibility in tactics. This could mean expressing openness to interim arrangements. For example, Africa could agree to a first phase of reform where two African countries gain permanent seats without veto, on the condition that a review mechanism is in place to revisit the veto issue (as the G4 once proposed). This would mirror the compromise that almost materialized in 2005, effectively not letting the perfect be the enemy of the good. Some African leaders have hinted at such pragmatism: at the AU summit in February 2023, it was noted that gaining “at least one” African permanent seat in the near term might be more realistic than holding out for two with veto, given the current global resistance to veto expansion. [30] If Africa signaled willingness to accept an incremental outcome (say, one African permanent member without veto as a start), it could break the stalemate and put the onus on the P5 and others to agree or be seen as obstructing justice. The risk, of course, is that interim status might become permanent, and the second seat or veto rights might never materialize. Many in Africa fear a “two-tier” Council where new members remain perpetually junior. Any flexibility would, therefore, require ironclad guarantees and timelines, something difficult to obtain. Nonetheless, this kind of phased reform idea could be re-examined as a way to get the ball rolling after 20 years of immobility.
2. Addressing the Selection Dilemma Openly: A key internal challenge Africa must resolve is the question of which countries would occupy permanent seats. After two decades, the lack of a formula suggests that African leaders have avoided the conversation to preserve unity, but this ambiguity may now be doing more harm than good. Some analysts argue that the AU should outline a rotation or election system for the African permanent seats ahead of time. [31] Possibilities include rotating the seats among Africa’s sub-regions (so that, for instance, each region gets a turn for a certain term of years), or selecting a small pool of candidate states that meet agreed criteria (such as economic size, military capacity, contributions to UN peacekeeping, diplomatic experience, ) from which the two could be chosen. The Ezulwini Consensus deliberately did not specify names, and it asserts that the “African Union will choose the continent’s permanent members” when the reform is agreed. [32] But without a procedure in place, this promise rings hollow. It may be time for the AU to sketch a mechanism at least. Even a commitment to a democratic process – for example, a vote among AU member states to elect the representatives if and when seats are available – would signal that Africa is ready to move from theory to practice. It would also undercut the external narrative that Africa is too divided to capitalize on reform. Yes, any such discussion will be sensitive: competition among heavyweights like Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt could intensify, and countries that see themselves as champions of their sub-regions will lobby hard. However, African unity has matured, and the AU has experience dealing with high-stakes elections (such as the contest for AU Commission Chair). Transparent criteria and an agreed process could actually strengthen the common position by assuring all member states that Africa’s choices will be fair and merit-based. This step would require courageous leadership within Africa – essentially, Africa must trust itself to handle an internal democratic selection, just as it calls for democracy at the UN level.
3. Enhancing Diplomatic Outreach and Alliances: Another strategic adjustment would be for Africa to redouble outreach to other regional blocs and build a broader coalition for Council reform. While Africa has been vocal, it sometimes appeared isolated in the UN reform debates, especially when pitted against the proposals of others. Going forward, African diplomats could seek a formal synergy between Ezulwini and the G4 proposal – finding common ground with Brazil, India, Germany, and Japan on a reform model that satisfies both. Notably, there is significant overlap: both the G4 and Africa want expansion in both permanent and non-permanent categories. The major difference has been the veto and the number of seats. A grand bargain could involve Africa supporting an enlarged Council that accommodates the G4 countries as permanent members, in exchange for the G4’s full support of two African permanent seats and acceptance of either full veto rights for all new members or a collective push for veto abolition. Over the years, mistrust grew (in 2005, the G4 and Africa struggled to align, and the initiative failed). However, with current global support coalescing around the idea of “at least one African permanent member,” the G4 and Africa have more to gain by working together than separately – they share the goal of breaking the P5 monopoly. Similarly, Africa might find common cause with Latin American and Caribbean states, with their own aspirations (e.g., Brazil’s bid or calls for a permanent seat for Latin America). To date, the United for Consensus (UfC) group, including some Latin countries, has opposed new permanents. African diplomacy could engage those skeptics by addressing their concerns (for example, Italy and others fear losing influence if regional rivals gain permanency – Africa could advocate for provisions that strengthen the accountability of new members or periodic review of seats to alleviate such fears). In essence, Africa’s strategy could shift from mainly moral advocacy to active negotiation and alliance-building, presenting itself as a constructive broker in reform talks rather than a passive claimant of entitlements.
4. Leverage Africa’s Rising Geopolitical Clout: Beyond the UN itself, Africa can capitalize on its growing influence in other spheres to advance UNSC reform. The continent’s recent entry into the G20 is one such leverage point – African leaders can use the G20 platform to garner support from major economies for UN reform, making it a topic of global economic governance discussions. The AU could propose a statement or working group on UN reform within the G20, linking the effectiveness of global peace and security governance to development (an argument that resonates with many G20 members, especially in the wake of conflicts affecting energy and food security). Additionally, Africa’s partnerships with powers like China, India, and Turkey can be avenues to press those countries to champion UNSC reform in their bilateral dealings with P5 members. For instance, as China seeks African backing in various international forums, African states can reciprocally seek Beijing’s more forceful support on concrete reform steps (not just lip service). The same goes for relationships with the European Union: Europe’s credibility in Africa, to some extent, hinges on supporting African representation (France has publicly backed Africa’s case, and the UK post-Brexit also sees courting the Commonwealth and Africa as important). Africa should ensure these partners translate words into deeds, perhaps by pushing for a UN General Assembly resolution that records the commitment to add African permanent members – even if such a resolution is not a Charter amendment itself, it would create political pressure by putting countries on the record. In the past, Africa has been cautious about triggering a vote in the General Assembly on reform because of uncertainty about the outcome. However, a carefully managed diplomatic campaign could make a symbolic GA vote a show of global support for Africa’s claims, thus framing UNSC reform as a matter of when and how not if. In 2005, there was nearly a vote (which was pulled last-minute due to lack of consensus); two decades later, Africa might consider orchestrating a moral victory, at least through the General Assembly, to shake the process out of the deadlock.
5. Broadening the Agenda – “Beyond Ezulwini”: It may also be time for Africa to articulate a broader vision of UN reform beyond just Council seats. The Ezulwini Consensus actually included other elements (such as calls for better financing for AU peace operations and more African involvement in decision-making across UN organs). Emphasizing these can showcase Africa as a stakeholder in comprehensive UN revitalization, not merely seeking advantages for itself. For example, Africa could lead on proposals to reform the UNSC’s working methods – pushing for arrangements that give non-members (like the AU or concerned states) a greater voice in deliberations affecting them. Even without a permanent seat, such changes could incrementally increase African impact on outcomes. By championing issues like veto restraint (e.g., endorsing the French-Mexican initiative to suspend veto use in mass atrocities) or greater transparency and accountability of UNSC decisions, Africa demonstrates that its goal is a more democratic and effective UN for all, not just prestige. This principled approach builds goodwill and can attract wider support, bolstering Africa’s moral leadership. In essence, Africa should continue to lead by example in advocating fairness in the international system – much as it has done with initiatives on climate justice and equitable COVID-19 vaccine access – thereby underlining the credibility of its call for a fairer Security Council.
In weighing these strategies, African states must remain united. The Ezulwini Consensus was, above all, a product of African unity, and any evolution of strategy should be agreed upon through AU mechanisms to maintain that solidarity. Disunity is the biggest threat to Africa’s influence. External powers would seize upon any serious split (for instance, if some countries broke from Ezulwini to pursue national bids or accept lesser reforms) to marginalize Africa in negotiations. Thus, even as the debate opens on tactical shifts, the AU and the C10 need to keep tight cohesion and ensure continuous consultation with all member states. The African consensus can be updated or refined, but it should not be abandoned or undermined from within.
Conclusion
At the 20-year mark of the Ezulwini Consensus, Africa’s pursuit of Security Council reform stands at a poignant juncture. On one level, the influence of Ezulwini is unmistakable: it gave Africa a clear and compelling voice that has reverberated through the halls of the UN and chancelleries around the world. The past two decades have seen Africa transform from a bystander to an agenda-setter on UN reform. The moral high ground occupied by the Ezulwini Consensus – demanding justice and equality in global governance – has drawn broad sympathy and altered the terms of debate. Few now contest the narrative that the current UNSC configuration is an anachronism; as UN Secretary-General António Guterres conceded, the Council reflects “power structures of 1945” and it is “unacceptable” that a continent of over a billion people has no permanent voice there. [33] In this sense, Africa’s influence has been profound: it placed the issue of African representation front and center in discussions of multilateral reform.
However, the hard power realities remain unchanged – a sobering reminder of the limits of moral suasion in international politics. Despite Africa’s tireless advocacy, the UNSC’s composition in 2025 is the same as it was in 2005. The Ezulwini Consensus has not (yet) delivered the concrete outcome it sought. This does not mean Ezulwini “failed” – rather, it has not succeeded yet. The obstacles have been considerable, and largely external: P5 vested interests, competing blocs, and lack of a binding negotiation process. Africa cannot by itself reform the UN Charter; it has laid the groundwork for an eventual reform that will inevitably have to address Africa’s claims. The question now is how to translate Africa’s diplomatic capital into actual change.
Africa’s current diplomatic standing offers reasons for optimism. The continent is more politically united (through the AU) and more respected globally than two decades ago. African states have shown they can organize around common interests and even achieve breakthroughs – the AU’s G20 membership is a recent example of success through collective diplomacy. If similar focus and unity are applied to the UNSC reform push in the coming years, Africa could seize the open windows of opportunity. There are signs the opportunity may be nearing: global pressures such as great power tensions and criticisms of UN effectiveness are sparking a fresh drive for reform. The year 2024–2025 is seeing a “UN Summit of the Future” process, wherein many countries are urging tangible outcomes on Security Council reform. Through the C10, Africa has been actively engaging in this process, insisting that any “Pact of the Future” must acknowledge and prioritize the issue of Africa’s exclusion.
Ultimately, Africa’s influence will be judged by how loudly it speaks and what it can achieve. The Ezulwini Consensus gave Africa a voice; the next phase must aim to give Africa a seat – or two – at the table. This will likely require a deft mix of stubborn principles, strategic compromise, unity at home, and alliance-building abroad. As Africa reflects on twenty years of Ezulwini, there is a case for renewing the consensus – reaffirming its core demands (to show the world that Africa’s resolve has not waned) while also refreshing its strategy (to show the world that Africa is ready to be a problem-solver and deal-maker). Such a renewed approach could, for example, incorporate a roadmap for implementation or spell out how Africa envisions working with other states to achieve a win-win outcome.
In African diplomatic circles, there is a saying: “If you want to go fast, go alone. If you want to go far, go together.” The Ezulwini Consensus was about going together, and it has indeed taken Africa far in terms of shaping the debate. The finish line – a reformed Security Council – is not yet in sight, but with unity and smart diplomacy, it may finally be attainable. Twenty years on, the vision of Ezulwini remains as valid as ever: a Security Council that reflects the twenty-first century, not the mid-twentieth; a UN where Africa is not a supplicant but an equal stakeholder; and a global order where fairness, not might alone, determines decision-making. The journey from Ezulwini in 2005 to today has been long and arduous. The journey from today to a reformed UNSC may still be lengthy – but Africa’s influence is rising, and its voice, once marginalized, is now impossible to ignore. In the spirit of Ezulwini, Africa must continue to speak boldly and collaborate. In doing so, it honors the vision of its founders and inches closer to the day when we can finally say the Security Council includes Africa as a complete and rightful member of the world’s top peace and security body.
[1] Alene, Niguse M., Ali, Mohammed S. and Tadesse, Kebede Y. (2023) “Africa’s Quest for Reform of the United Nations Security Council.” African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 23(1). (The common African position demands two permanent seats with a veto and five non-permanent seats; there is a lack of African consensus on selecting those seats, reflecting continental unity challenges).
[2] Ibid.
[3] Eguegu, Ovigwe, Hannah Ryder, and Trevor Lwere. “Africa’s Design for a Reformed UN Security Council.” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 1 October 2024. Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/africas-design-reformed-un-security-council [Accessed 18 April 2025]. Initially articulated in the Ezulwini Consensus two decades ago, Africa’s demands include two permanent UN Security Council seats with full veto powers to address historical injustices and enhance Africa’s representation in global decision-making structures.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Alene, Niguse M., Ali, Mohammed S. and Tadesse, Kebede Y. (2023) “Africa’s Quest for Reform of the United Nations Security Council.” African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 23(1).
[6] United Nations. “Africa Has Provided Clear, Compelling Vision for Security Council Representation, Speakers Stress in Historic Debate on Enhancing Continent’s Participation.” UN Security Council Press Release SC/15788, 12 August 2024. Available at: https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15788.doc.htm [Accessed 18 April 2025]. The current structure of the UN Security Council, reflecting outdated 1945 power dynamics, reveals “cracks” in the organization’s legitimacy, particularly through Africa’s lack of permanent representation despite its significant global importance.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Adebajo, Adekeye (2005) “Security Council reform: Who represents Africa?” Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), 2 August 2005. (Describes early AU meetings on UN reform; candidacies of Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, and others; difficulties in achieving African consensus and consideration of dropping veto demand during 2005 negotiations).
[9] Cf. United Nations. “Africa Has Provided Clear, Compelling Vision for Security Council Representation, Speakers Stress in Historic Debate on Enhancing Continent’s Participation.” UN Security Council Press Release SC/15788, 12 August 2024.
[10] Eguegu, Ovigwe; Ryder, Hannah and Lwere, Trevor (2024) “Africa’s Design for a Reformed UN Security Council.” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Commentary, 1 October 2024. Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/africas-design-reformed-un-security-council [Accessed 1 April 2025]. (Provides a 20-year review of Africa’s position; notes that by 2023–24, all P5 members have at least nominally supported African permanent membership. Details positions of UK, US, and France – supporting African seats but not veto extension – and notes China and Russia’s qualified support. Remarkably, records that the BRICS joint statement in 2023 officially acknowledged the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration for the first time, indicating growing support for Africa’s stance in the Global South). Also, Murithi, Tim (2024) “Africa and the US ‘Non-Proposal’ on UN Security Council Reform.” Africa Up Close (Wilson Center blog), 23 September 2024. Available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/africa-and-us-non-proposal-un-security-council-reform [Accessed 1 April 2025].
[11] Eguegu, Ovigwe, Hannah Ryder, and Trevor Lwere. “Africa’s Design for a Reformed UN Security Council.” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 1 October 2024. Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/africas-design-reformed-un-security-council
[12]Alene, Niguse M., Mohammed S. Ali, and Kebede Y. Tadesse. “Africa’s Quest for Reform of the United Nations Security Council.” ACCORD Analysis, 7 March 2023. Available at: https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/africas-quest-for-reform-of-the-united-nations-security-council/ [Accessed 18 April 2025].
[13] PSC Report (ISS) (2023) “Multilateralism takes center stage at 36th AU Summit.” ISS Africa, PSC Insights, 20 February 2023. Available at: https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/multilateralism-takes-centre-stage-at-36th-au-summit [Accessed 30 March 2025]. (Summarises outcomes of the AU Summit in Addis Ababa, 2023. Notes Africa’s renewed call for UNSC reform and the decision to empower the Committee of Ten to intensify lobbying. Mentions that some AU members suggested aiming for at least one permanent seat as a realistic step, although the official Ezulwini position remains two permanent plus five non-permanent seats. Observe that Africa’s push needs P5 buy-in and, importantly, agreement within Africa on who will occupy any new seats – hinting that the AU might eventually have to vote on candidates, a departure from its usual consensus approach).
[14] Ibid.
[15] Alene, Niguse M., Ali, Mohammed S. and Tadesse, Kebede Y. (2023) “Africa’s Quest for Reform of the United Nations Security Council.” African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 23(1).
[16] Ibid.
[17] Adebajo, Adekeye (2005) “Security Council reform: Who represents Africa?” Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), 2 August 2005.
[18] Murithi, Tim. “Africa and the US ‘Non-Proposal’ on UN Security Council Reform.” Africa Up Close, Wilson Center, 23 September 2024. Available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/africa-and-us-non-proposal-un-security-council-reform [Accessed 18 April 2025]., Murithi, Tim (2024) “Africa and the US ‘Non-Proposal’ on UN Security Council Reform.” Africa Up Close (Wilson Center blog), 23 September 2024. Available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/africa-and-us-non-proposal-un-security-council-reform [Accessed 1 April 2025]. (Analyses recent UNSC reform dynamics; notes US support for two African seats without veto – a stance falling short of Ezulwini – and warns that excluding veto will likely lead Africa to reject reforms, keeping the status quo. It highlights the risk of a “blame game” over Africa’s lack of consensus on candidates and suggests Africa might turn to forums like BRICS, NAM, and FOCAC if UNSC reform stalls).
[19] Adebajo, Adekeye (2005) “Security Council reform: Who represents Africa?” Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), 2 August 2005.
[20] Eguegu, Ovigwe, Hannah Ryder, and Trevor Lwere. “Africa’s Design for a Reformed UN Security Council.” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 1 October 2024. Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/africas-design-reformed-un-security-council [Accessed 18 April 2025].
[21] United Nations. “Africa Has Provided Clear, Compelling Vision for Security Council Representation, Speakers Stress in Historic Debate on Enhancing Continent’s Participation.” UN Security Council Press Release SC/15788, 12 August 2024. Available at: https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15788.doc.htm [Accessed 18 April 2025].
[22] Alene, Niguse M., Ali, Mohammed S. and Tadesse, Kebede Y. (2023) “Africa’s Quest for Reform of the United Nations Security Council.” African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 23(1).
[23] Ibid.
[24] Murithi, Tim (2024) “Africa and the US ‘Non-Proposal’ on UN Security Council Reform.” Africa Up Close (Wilson Center blog), 23 September 2024. Available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/africa-and-us-non-proposal-un-security-council-reform [Accessed 1 April 2025].
[25] Eguegu, Ovigwe; Ryder, Hannah, and Lwere, Trevor (2024) “Africa’s Design for a Reformed UN Security Council.” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Commentary, 1 October 2024. Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/africas-design-reformed-un-security-council [Accessed 1 April 2025].
[26] PSC Report (ISS) (2023) “Multilateralism takes center stage at 36th AU Summit.” ISS Africa, PSC Insights, 20 February 2023. Available at: https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/multilateralism-takes-centre-stage-at-36th-au-summit [Accessed 30 March 2025]. (Summarises outcomes of the AU Summit in Addis Ababa, 2023. Notes Africa’s renewed call for UNSC reform and the decision to empower the Committee of Ten to intensify lobbying. Mentions that some AU members suggested aiming for at least one permanent seat as a realistic step, although the official Ezulwini position remains two permanent plus five non-permanent seats. Observe that Africa’s push needs P5 buy-in and, importantly, agreement within Africa on who will occupy any new seats – hinting that the AU might eventually have to vote on candidates, a departure from its usual consensus approach).
[27] Acharya, Shivangi and Singh, Sarita (2023) “G20 admits African Union as permanent member.” Reuters, 9 September 2023. (News report on the AU joining the G20 as a full member. Notes that the AU, representing 55 African states, now sits alongside the EU in the G20, giving the continent a stronger voice in global economic governance. Indian PM Narendra Modi’s quote welcoming the AU and emphasizing it will strengthen the voice of the Global South is included, reflecting widespread support for greater African representation in international forums).
[28] Eguegu, Ovigwe; Ryder, Hannah and Lwere, Trevor (2024) “Africa’s Design for a Reformed UN Security Council.” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Commentary, 1 October 2024. Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/africas-design-reformed-un-security-council [Accessed 1 April 2025]. (Provides a 20-year review of Africa’s position; notes that by 2023–24, all P5 members have at least nominally supported African permanent membership. Details positions of UK, US, and France – supporting African seats but not veto extension – and notes China and Russia’s qualified support. Remarkably, records that the BRICS joint statement in 2023 officially acknowledged the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration for the first time, indicating growing support for Africa’s stance in the Global South).
[29] Murithi, Tim (2024) “Africa and the US ‘Non-Proposal’ on UN Security Council Reform.” Africa Up Close (Wilson Center blog), 23 September 2024. Available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/africa-and-us-non-proposal-un-security-council-reform [Accessed 1 April 2025].
[30] PSC Report. “Multilateralism Takes Centre Stage at 36th AU Summit.” Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa), 20 February 2023. Available at: https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/multilateralism-takes-centre-stage-at-36th-au-summit [Accessed 18 April 2025].
[31] Alene, Niguse M., Ali, Mohammed S. and Tadesse, Kebede Y. (2023) “Africa’s Quest for Reform of the United Nations Security Council.” African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 23(1).
[32] United Nations (2024) “Africa Has Provided Clear, Compelling Vision for Security Council Representation, Speakers Stress in Historic Debate on Enhancing Continent’s Participation.” UN Security Council Meeting Coverage, SC/15788, 12 August 2024.
[33] Ibid.
